7 Article 19(7)(a) states:
In the case of a federal State, the following provisions shall apply: (a) in respect of Conventions and Recommendations which the federal government regards as appropriate under its constitutional system for federal action, the obligations of the federal State shall be the same as those of Members which are not federal States. ILO Const., supra note 1, Art. 19(7)(a). Article 19(7) contains sophisticated provisions governing the obligations of federal states.
Legal obligations may emerge from the complaint process provided for in Article 26 of the ILO Constitution. If a party to a convention is alleged to be out of compliance, a complaint may be lodged by a nongovernmental delegate or by a state that is a party to that convention. When this procedure is invoked, the ILO Governing Body may refer the complaint to a commission of inquiry that will investigate, issue findings, and make recommendations. . In principle, either the complainant government or the respondent government could have recourse to the ICJ to contest the findings and recommendations of the commission of inquiry. The ICJ would seem to have jurisdiction because it is specifically provided for in the treaty establishing the ILO Constitution. How the ICJ might assess its competence remains to be seen, as the judicial provisions in the ILO Constitution (which hark back to 1919) have not been used. ILO Const., supra, Art. 29(2); ICJ Statute, Art. 36(1).
One jurisdictional issue is that states do not call an ILO commission of inquiry into being. Instead, the ILO Governing Body can set up a commission on its own or following a complaint by a state. ILO Const., supra, Art. 26(1), (4). Thus, commentators have raised the question whether the intervening role of the Governing Body in setting up the commission could deprive the ICJ of jurisdiction because no formal dispute between two states would exist. The declaration was carefully drafted to make clear that, under its terms, ILO member states are not obliging themselves to adhere to the ILO conventions covering the fundamental labor principles. Moreover, the declaration was not designed to be enforced through ILO supervisory mechanisms and lacks its own complaint mechanism. 21 The ILO declaration is examined in Brian Langille, The ILO Nevertheless, the declaration can influence states because it both concretizes the concept of "fundamental principles and rights at work" and recommits member states to the proposition that ILO membership implies an obligation to respect certain fundamental principles. 23 The ILO declaration is supported by a "follow-up" procedure asking governments that have not ratified one or more of the fundamental conventions to report annually on the status of the relevant rights and principles within their borders, noting impediments to ratification and areas where technical assistance may be required. 24 The annual reports by the U.S. government point out ways that the U.S. Constitution and laws protect freedom of association. But the U.S. reports have not discussed impediments to ratification of C.
87.
In abstaining from becoming a party to C. 87, the United States has disadvantaged itself in several ways. The most important may be the reputational cost within the ILO of not being a party to this core convention. 25 Of the eight labor rights conventions 23 The key political momentum for the declaration came from U.S. employers. There is agreement by the U.S. Government agencies concerned, the AFL-CIO, and the U.S. Council for International Business, that each ILO convention will be examined on its merits on a tripartite basis; that if there are any differences between the convention and Federal law and practice, these will be dealt with in the normal legislative process; and that there is no intention to change State law and practice by Federal action through ratification of ILO conventions, and the examination will include possible conflicts between Federal and State law that would be caused by such ratification. consideration of other conventions that do not fit in these two categories would violate the ground rules and would be presumptively inappropriate for Senate action.
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The central principle of the ground rules seems to be that ILO conventions, as treaties under the U.S. Constitution, will not be used as a back door for changing federal and state labor law.
One can observe various actors putting their own spin on the ground rules.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, those rules state that "no ILO convention will be ratified unless or until U.S. law and practice, at both the federal and state levels, is in full conformity with its provisions." 84 According to the U.S. Council for International Business, the rules dictate that "no ILO convention will be forwarded to the U.S. Senate for ratification if ratification would require any change in U.S. federal or state laws."
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In my view, the ground rules do not assert that when U.S. law is inconsistent with an ILO convention, ratification of that convention is off the table. Rather, they suggest that when such an inconsistency exists, Congress must change U.S. law (or begin doing so) before the convention will be acted upon by the Senate. In assessing whether U.S.
labor standards should be brought up to the international level, each ILO convention is to "be examined on its merits."
83 Id. at S479. employer delegation to the ILO, wrote a lengthy study published by the Labor Policy Association. 88 Potter concluded that if C. 87 were ratified and, as a treaty, superseded contrary requirements in U.S. legislation, the Convention would affect or alter U.S. labor law in many significant ways. 89 Another section of his study considered the possibility of ratifying C. 87 and C. 98 on a non-self-executing basis, but concluded that without U.S.
implementing legislation, the U.S. obligations under those two conventions would be breached.
Periodically, the U.S. government is asked by the ILO to report on the status of C. Congress must receive implementing legislation to alter tariffs and customs treatment.
Such legislation includes a provision stating that in the event of a conflict between the trade agreement and U.S. law, the latter will prevail. the United States waits (forever) to join the WTO until it can be sure that no domestic law or practice violates WTO law. The lesson from the WTO experience is that achieving and sustaining national compliance must be a continuous process.
If a tripartite review of C. 87 identifies specific statutory provisions that fall below the international standard, Congress should examine whether legal reforms should be adopted. 104 The U.S. labor market is not isolated from those of other countries, and can potentially gain if U.S. law is adapted to reflect more effective foreign practices in 103 Since 1995, WTO panels have found U.S. violations in thirty-three separate cases. Other WTO members besides the United States are also regularly found to be out of compliance. Numerous WTO cases have been about measures adopted after the WTO went into force, yet many others have been about measures in place when the country joined the WTO. The WTO dispute system makes no distinction between those two temporal categories.
104 If changes at the subnational level would be needed to achieve conformity, then Congress ought to consider requiring such changes. (noting that "there has been no major labour law reform-that is, reform of collective labour rights and labour-management relations-since 1947, when the Taft-Hartley amendments added a rash of anti-labour provisions"). 106 Moreover, Senate consent to the Convention will require a two-thirds vote, which would seem difficult to obtain if the business community opposes that action. Reportedly, there is also concern among American sovereigntists because the ILO Constitution provides for possible referrals to the ICJ. See ILO Const., supra note 1, Arts. 29(2), 37(1); see also note 20 supra. No such referrals to the ICJ have occurred, however, and the possibility that a state could be brought to the ICJ against its will seems remote. If a state were the object of an Article 29 commission of inquiry and were found to be in violation of an ILO convention it had ratified, the state could decide against referring the matter to the ICJ. The other provision for ICJ referral is Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, which states that "[a]ny question or dispute relating to the interpretation of this Constitution or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members . . . shall be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice." Yet by its terms, Article 37(1) seems to be about questions of interpretation, rather than questions of implementation by a particular state. Moreover, Article 37(1) is not preconditioned on whether a member state has ratified a particular ILO convention. Hence, ratification of C. 87 does not trigger a new possibility of an ICJ referral.
